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I.   INTRODUCTION  
The Secretary begins her Memorandum in Support of Defendant‟s Motion for Summary 
Judgment with bald assertions rather than legal demonstration.  For example, she says that the 
penalty is “a tax penalty . . . well within the bounds of Congress‟s Article I powers.”  (Doc. 91 at 
14).  But the penalty enforces the mandate, not a tax, and therefore is not a tax penalty.  Nor is it 
true as the Secretary says that Congress has the power to take any rational measures whatever “to 
ensure the success of its larger reforms of the interstate market.”  (Id.)  The Supreme Court has 
always held that the Commerce Clause, and the associated Necessary and Proper Clause, have 
justiciable outer limits.  M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (for a 
means to be Necessary and Proper it must comport with the letter and spirit of the Constitution); 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824) (meaning of “interstate commerce” and 
“regulate” justiciable); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 122 n.20 (1942) (collecting cases 
striking down legislation for violations of the Commerce Clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995) (striking congressional enactment because it was beyond the limits of the 
Commerce Clause); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997) (“„When a La[w] . . . 
for carrying into [e]xecution‟ the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty 
reflected in the various constitutional provisions . . . it is not a „La[w] . . . proper for carrying 
into [e]xecution the Commerce Clause‟ and is thus, in the words of The Federalist, „merely [an] 
ac[t] of usurpation‟ which „deserves to be treated as such.‟”); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732-
33 (1999) (same); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) (it is the prerogative 
of the Supreme Court to define the outer boundary of the Commerce Clause and other claims of 
federal power). 
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This Court has already stated that “[n]ever before has the Commerce Clause and the 
associated Necessary and Proper Clause been extended this far.”  (Doc. 84 at 25).  The negative 
outer limits established in Lopez, Printz, Alden, and Morrison are preemptory, Morrison, 529 
U.S. at 618-19 (“„We always have rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of 
federal power that would permit Congress to exercise a police power‟”), and binding on the 
lower Federal courts.  Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 
484 (1989) (“If a precedent of th[e] [Supreme] Court has direct application in a case, yet appears 
to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the 
case which directly controls, leaving to th[e] [Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its 
own decisions.”).  
In her Answer, the Secretary pled that the status of being uninsured is “an economic 
decision” that “has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”  (Doc. 87 at 3-4 ¶ 17).  Now she 
argues that “the minimum coverage provision easily falls within the commerce power, for it 
regulates conduct that has substantial effects on interstate commerce.”  (Doc. 91 at 14).  
Referring to the possibility of consuming medical care in the future, while uninsured and 
otherwise unable to pay for it, as “conduct” is an idiosyncratic use of a word that in all of its 
definitions as a noun denotes and connotes action.  The American Heritage Dictionary at 278 
(Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston 1981).  Nor is “conduct” even the legally apt word.  Since 
Wickard, the Supreme Court has progressed no further than to hold that Congress can regulate 
three things under the Commerce Clause: (1) the “use of the channels of interstate commerce,” 
(2) “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,” and (3) “activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (emphasis added).  It is only the third prong 
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that is at issue in this case and under that prong the operative word is “activities.”  And, of 
course, the status of being uninsured is inactivity; the opposite of activity.  
Much more than word play is at issue.  If Congress can commandeer the people into 
commerce in order to regulate them, then the very nature of the relationship between citizen and 
national government will have been profoundly changed.  For then, in the words of Alexander 
Hamilton, the Federal Government would be improperly empowered to “„penetrate the recesses 
of domestic life, and control, in all respects, the private conduct of individuals.‟”  Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 592.  Congress, for all intents and purposes, would have a police power.   
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. Const. amend. X.  It 
is no more permissible under our federal form of government to commandeer the people (except 
for traditional rights and duties of citizenship such as compulsory military service, census 
enumeration and jury service which are themselves tied to enumerated powers), than it is to 
commandeer state officials or legislatures.  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (Congress may 
not commandeer Sheriff/Coroner); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Congress 
may not commandeer States).  In advancing this point, the Commonwealth does not seek to 
assert any parens patriae claims, but to instead demonstrate that the Secretary‟s claim, that 
Congress was engaged in ordinary and traditional regulation of commerce when it passed the 
mandate and penalty, is mistaken.   
The Secretary‟s statement that “[i]nsurance–purchase requirements have long been 
fixtures in the United States Code,” (Doc. 91 at 15), to the extent it is true, is also irrelevant.  As 
a part of its regulation of those already voluntarily engaged in commerce, Congress has 
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sometimes required insurance relevant to that activity.  This is not precedent for the naked 
command that those not engaged in commerce must buy a good or service from another citizen.  
The assertion that “[i]t has also been established for more than a century that Congress 
has power to compel a transaction – in particular, to require the sale of property through eminent 
domain – in order to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective” (Doc. 91 at 15) is 
founded upon a category error.  Eminent domain is a taking, not a sale.  It is expressly 
recognized as such in the Fifth Amendment and is bounded by constitutional and judicial 
protections and limits.  
The Secretary‟s reliance on Wickard and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (Doc. 91 
at 15), is of no moment for the Secretary‟s position.  Those cases stand merely for the 
proposition that the affirmative outer limits of the Commerce Clause embrace voluntary 
cultivation of a commodity which in the aggregate has a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.  
The statement that “Congress repeatedly treated the minimum coverage provision as a 
tax” (Doc. 91 at 15) is demonstrably false given the text of the statute.  Congress asserted 
authority to act only under the Commerce Clause, made Commerce Clause findings, and then 
called the penalty a penalty, although it denominated taxes as taxes elsewhere in the act.  PPACA 
§ 1501 at § 5000A(b)(1); §§ 9001; 9004; 9017; 10907.  A Court will not re-label as a tax that 
which Congress has denominated an exercise of its power to regulate commerce.  Bd. of Trs. of 
the Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 58 (1933).  Furthermore, whether the penalty is a 
penalty and not a tax is justiciable.  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 841 (1995) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 61 (1936)).  The difference 
between a tax and a penalty is that “„[a] tax is an enforced contribution to provide for the support 
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of government; a penalty, as the word is here used, is an exaction imposed by statute as 
punishment for an unlawful act.‟”  United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 
518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996) (quoting United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931)).  
Because the penalty will produce no revenue at all if it works as intended, and would, in that 
circumstance, only alter conduct, it is intrinsically a penalty and not a tax.  
Once it is determined that the penalty is just that, a penalty, the Secretary‟s tax argument 
collapses back into her Commerce Clause argument.  As this Court stated in denying the 
Secretary‟s motion to dismiss, “Virginia correctly noted during oral argument that the power of 
Congress to enact a penalty is more constrained than its taxing power under the General Welfare 
Clause – it must be in aid of an enumerated power.”  (Doc. 84 at 27) (citations omitted).  That 
enumerated power cannot be the taxing power because the penalty is in aid of the mandate which 
is clearly not a tax.  
The Secretary‟s assertion that “[t]he provision thus falls easily within Congress‟s 
independent authority to lay taxes and make expenditures for the general welfare” is contrary to 
binding precedent.  (Doc. 91 at 16).  Even assuming that a court would first ignore Congress‟s 
denomination of the penalty as a penalty, and then alter its essential nature by ignoring its actual 
function so as to call it a tax, a court would then be met with the rule that when a tax is being 
used for regulation, it must pass muster under an enumerated power other than the taxing power 
to justify that regulation.  Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 
(1922).  See also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-19 (“„We always have rejected readings of the 
Commerce Clause and the Scope of Federal Power that would permit Congress to exercise a 
police power.‟”) (bolded emphasis added); Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 
U.S. 457, 468-69 (1982) (alternative power will not be used to support enactment if it evades the 
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limits of another grant); Butler, 297 U.S. at 68; Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 17-18 
(1925).  If this rule is to be altered, that change can be made only by the Supreme Court of the 
United States.  Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484.  
Finally, the Secretary‟s assertion that the Commonwealth is somehow disadvantaged in 
mounting a facial challenge to PPACA is mistaken.  (Doc. 91 at 16).  All claims that Congress 
has exceeded its enumerated powers are necessarily facial.  Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The 
Subjects of the Constitution, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1209, 1236 (2010) (“A challenge to an action (or 
„Act‟) of Congress must be „facial.‟  It makes no sense to speak of „as applied‟ challenges to 
legislative actions, because the challenged action is complete before the application begins.”).  
The binary question of which sovereign, the United States or the Commonwealth, has the power 
to regulate the uninsured in Virginia, turns on no facts of enforcement, but only on a comparison 
between the Health Care Freedom Act, PPACA and the Constitution, aided by the usual sources 
of constitutional construction.  62 Stan. L. Rev. at 1276 (“In other words, in a Commerce Clause 
case, lex ipsa loquitur:  the law speaks for itself.”).  See also Id. at 1279 (“in other words, a 
Commerce Clause challenge cannot be as applied”); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 
U.S. 721, 743 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“When a litigant claims that legislation has denied 
him individual rights secured by the Constitution, the Court ordinarily asks whether the 
legislation is constitutional as applied to him.  When, on the other hand, a federal statute is 
challenged as going beyond Congress‟s enumerated powers, under our precedents the Court first 
asks whether the statute is unconstitutional on its face.”) (citing, inter alia, Lopez and Morrison 
(other internal citations omitted)).  Because the mandate and penalty exceed the outer limits of 
the Commerce Clause and the associated Necessary and Proper Clause, the Secretary is not 
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entitled to Summary Judgment on her claim that the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act violates 
the Supremacy Clause.  
II.   RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS  
1. The Commonwealth agrees that the alleged facts upon which the Secretary relies are not 
adjudicative facts.  (Doc. 91 at 16 n.1.).  As a consequence, disagreements concerning her 
alleged legislative facts are no bar to summary judgment.  The Commonwealth denies 
that any hearings were held or any reports issued with respect to the Senate bill that 
passed on Christmas Eve 2009.  
2. The Commonwealth agrees that reviewing courts “„will consider legislative findings.‟”  
(Doc. 91 at 16 n.1.).  However, the secrecy, haste and parliamentary brutality associated 
with the passage of PPACA (Doc. 89 at 12-13 ¶ 8) should lead this Court to reject the 
premise that Congress took a hard look at the basis for its claimed power.  The 
Congressional Research Service had warned that the mandate was unprecedented (Doc. 
89 at 12 ¶ 7), and it is doubtful that a majority of those voting for it on a party line 
division had read the mammoth bill that emerged for their abbreviated consideration.  
3-12. The Commonwealth denies that sources extraneous to § 1501 of PPACA are “„legislative 
facts‟” in the sense that they compose any part of the legislative history of PPACA.  Nor 
can it be shown that they were before or in the mind of the majorities that passed 
PPACA.  They are also not entitled to deference as information that Congress might have 
believed to be true under a rational basis test.  (Doc. 91 at 16 n.1.)  The Commerce 
Clause rational basis test recognized in Raich and Lopez should not be confused with the 
deferential due process rational basis test of Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 
U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).  See United States v. Comstock, 176 L. Ed. 2d 878, 900-01 
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(2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Rather, the Commerce Clause rational basis test as it 
relates to the scope of the Commerce Clause asks whether Congress has a rational basis 
for believing that “respondents‟ activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect 
interstate commerce.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.  Because there are no activities at issue 
here, the test is not satisfied and the sources extraneous to PPACA cited in support of the 
Secretary‟s argument are legally irrelevant.  
13. See responses 2 and 3-12.  
14-15.    See response to 3-12. 
     16. See response to 2.  
17-22. See response to 3-12.  
     23. See responses 2 and 3-12.  
24-26. See response to 3-12.  
27-34. See responses 2 and 3-12.  The Commonwealth of Virginia further responds that PPACA  
 
 speaks for itself with respect to its operative provisions.  
 
35-38. See response to 3-12.  
39-40. See response to 27-34.  
41. See response to 3-12.    
 III.   STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 In a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden of showing the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact rests on the moving party.  RGI, Inc. v. Unified Industries, Inc., 
963 F.2d 658, 661 (4th Cir. 1992).  Disputed issues of fact will not prevent summary judgment; 
only disputed issues of material fact can preclude judgment.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 
U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).  “[A] claim that Congress violated the Constitution by making a law, 
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when it made the law, is inherently a „facial‟ challenge.”  62 Stan. L. Rev. at 1276.  A Commerce 
Clause challenge is such a claim, and “in a Commerce Clause case, lex ipsa loquitur:  the law 
speaks for itself.”  Id.  That is why the Supreme Court did “not speculate [in Lopez and 
Morrison] about whether either statute could be applied constitutionally under some other 
circumstances.”  Id. at 275.  As Justice Scalia has explained:   
When a litigant claims that legislation has denied him individual rights 
secured by the Constitution, the Court ordinarily asks first whether the 
legislation is Constitutional as applied to him.  See Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).  When, on the other hand, a Federal 
statute is challenged as going beyond Congress‟s enumerated powers, 
under our precedents the Court first asks whether the statute is 
unconstitutional on its face . . . .  See United States v. Morrison . . . ; 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); United States v. Lopez, . . . .  
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 743.     
 The cases cited by the Secretary are not to the contrary.  H.B. Rowe Co. v. Trippett, ___ 
F.3d ___, 2010 WL 2872076 (4th Cir. July 22, 2010), is an equal protection, not an enumerated 
powers case.  Trippett, * 23 (“When a plaintiff alleges, as Rowe does, that a statute violates the 
Equal Protection Clause, not only as applied, but also on its face, the plaintiff bears a heavy 
burden”) (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450-51 
(2008), a First and Fourteenth Amendment case).  Trippett also cited West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 292 (4th Cir. 2002), which in turn cited United States 
v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).  
 West Virginia is a Tenth Amendment challenge, but the substantive claim was 
commandeering through economic coercion.  However, because the Secretary had discretion to 
impose a sanction that was too small to be coercive within the meaning of that constitutional 
theory, the facial challenge failed.  West Virginia, 289 F.3d at 292 (“While it is certainly possible 
that, in a given case, the sanction actually imposed by the Secretary might not be proportionate to 
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the breach and might be constitutionally suspect, the mere possibility of a constitutional violation 
is insufficient to sustain a facial challenge to a statute.”) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 
U.S. 739 at 745).  
 Although West Virginia was denominated a Tenth Amendment claim, 289 F.3d at 291 
(“West Virginia‟s Tenth Amendment argument centers on its assertion that the Federal 
government would withhold all of West Virginia‟s Federal Medicaid Funds unless West Virginia 
implemented an estate recovery program”), it is not an enumerated powers case per se but a 
structural federalism commandeering claim.  Tellingly, Salerno was cited neither in Printz, 521 
U.S. 898, nor in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, the leading commandeering cases.  
Nor was it cited or applied in Morrison or Lopez.  And in Raich, the facial validity of the statute 
was conceded, 545 U.S. at 15, leaving the case to fall to the Wickard rule against atomized, as 
applied challenges in commodity cases.   
Furthermore, the continuing vitality of Salerno in any context is in doubt.  62 Stan. L. 
Rev. at 1234 (“Just two years ago, the Court acknowledged the uncertain vitality of the rule, but 
declined to resolve the uncertainty.”) (citing Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449 (“While some 
members of the Court have criticized the Salerno formulation, all agree that a facial challenge 
must fail where the statute has a „plainly legitimate sweep‟ . . . . Washington‟s primary system 
survives under either standard.”)).  See also Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 
517 U.S. 1174, 1175 (1996) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (“Salerno‟s rigid and 
unwise dictum has been properly ignored in subsequent cases even outside the abortion 
context.”).  
 Even if this Court were to find Nebraska v. EPA, 331 F.3d 995, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and 
United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 1996), persuasive on the proposition that 
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Salerno is applicable to at least some Commerce Clause enumerated powers cases, that would be 
of no practical moment in this case.  Because of the nature of the sovereign injury asserted by 
Virginia, the terms “facial” and “as applied” amount to distinctions without a difference.  
Because an as applied challenge would ask whether Virginia‟s claim succeeds under a single, 
known set of circumstances, it is no different than the facial claim.  Either Virginia‟s police 
power validly applies to the status of being uninsured, or the federal government can regulate 
that status under the Commerce Clause.  The question is binary and is to be answered by 
comparing the federal and State enactments to each other and to the Constitution, aided by the 
usual sources of constitutional construction – i.e., a facial analysis.    
IV. THE EXERCISE OF A CLAIMED POWER THAT IS 
TANTAMOUNT TO A NATIONAL POLICE POWER CANNOT BE 
SAVED SIMPLY BECAUSE IT IS INTEGRAL TO A LARGER 
REGULATORY SCHEME.  
A. Congress Has Acted Beyond The Outer Limits Of Its Broad 
Authority To Regulate Interstate Commerce.  
The Secretary‟s repeated quotations from Raich and Wickard establish the affirmative 
outer limits of the Commerce Clause at a point well short of commanding a citizen to purchase 
goods or services from another citizen.  (Doc. 91 at 31-32).  As those quotations demonstrate, the 
farthest Congress has ever been permitted to go is to “„regulate activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce,‟” including a “class of activities,” which “„taken in the aggregate,‟ 
substantially affects interstate commerce.”  (Doc. 91 at 31).  It is only in that context that this 
statement of the Secretary is true:  “Thus, when „a general regulatory statute bears a substantial 
relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute 
is of no consequence.‟  Raich, 545 U.S. at 17” (Doc. 91 at 32).  
Furthermore, it is not categorically true that “[i]n exercising its Commerce Clause power, 
Congress may also reach even wholly intrastate, non-commercial matters when it concludes that 
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the failure to do so would undercut a larger program regulating interstate commerce.”  (Doc. 91 
at 31-32) (citing Raich).  Although Raich permits the regulation of a local noncommercial 
activity, it defined noncommercial as not for sale.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 18.  The power of 
regulation was nonetheless defined in terms of “an economic „class of activities‟ that 
substantially affect commerce.”  Id. at 17.  See also Comstock, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 908.  (“Under the 
Court‟s precedents, Congress may not regulate noneconomic activity based solely on the effect 
such activity may have, in individual cases or in the aggregate, on interstate commerce.”  (citing 
Morrison and Lopez) (Thomas, J., and Scalia, J., dissenting)).  The Secretary‟s pronouncement 
that in a complex regulatory program, “[i]t is enough that the challenged provisions are an 
integral part of the regulatory program and that the regulatory scheme when considered as a 
whole satisfies this test,” (Doc. 91 at 32), has never won judicial consent in the context of 
commandeering a citizen into commerce in order to regulate him.  Indeed, the attempt has never 
even been made before.  In the context of that claim and this case, there is a collision with the 
negative outer limits of the Commerce Clause.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-19 (“„We always have 
rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that would permit 
Congress to exercise a police power.‟”).  All federal courts below the level of the Supreme Court 
lack authority to move this boundary.  Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484.   
Although there is a Commerce Clause rational basis test, it is not as described by the 
Secretary.  (Doc. 91 at 32).  Under that test, the Court‟s task is not “limited to determining 
„whether a rational basis exists‟ for Congress‟s conclusions” in general.  (Doc. 91 at 32).  As the 
Secretary correctly notes elsewhere (Doc. 91 at 31), the test, as it relates to the scope of the 
Commerce Clause, is “whether there is a rational basis for concluding that the class of activities, 
„taken in the aggregate,‟ substantially affects interstate commerce.”  Nor is it true that “[u]nder 
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rational basis review, this Court may not second-guess the factual record upon which Congress 
relied.”  (Id.).  Although Congress had made extensive findings with respect to the effect of 
violence against women on commerce, Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-29, the Supreme Court on 
review found the links too attenuated and remote to support the enactment.  That it is 
grammatically possible for Congress to assert a causal link between an activity and commerce “is 
merely the beginning, not the end, of the constitutional inquiry.”  Comstock, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 900 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566-67).  “The inferences must be controlled 
by some limitations lest, as Thomas Jefferson warned, congressional powers become completely 
unbounded by linking one power to another ad infinitum in a veritable game of „this is the house 
that Jack built.,”  Id.  
The crux of the Secretary‟s argument is found in this grammatically possible, but 
substantively nonsensical, statement: “Persons who finance their health care consumption 
without purchasing insurance are engaged in economic activity to at least as great an extent as 
the plaintiffs in Raich.”  (Doc. 91 at 32-33).  But the Secretary‟s own theory of the case is that in 
order to require insurance companies to insure pre-existing conditions at affordable rates, the 
rationally uninsured must be brought into the system now, lest they wait until they need medical 
care, and their premiums escape the intended scheme of cross subsidies.  (Doc. 91 at 37-41).  
This is not regulation of “[p]ersons who finance their health care consumption without 
purchasing insurance” (Doc. 91 at 32); it is regulation of the status of being uninsured citizens.  
This is not activity as that term has ever been understood in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  
Nor is it true that this is anything like the activities in Wickard and Raich, the cases that establish 
the existing affirmative outer limits of the Commerce Clause.  The explanation for the holdings 
in both of those cases is that when one engages in the voluntary activity of producing a 
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commodity, which in the aggregate affects the price of the whole, one is not entitled to an 
atomized, as applied defense to such regulation.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 19 (“In Wickard we had no 
difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for believing that, when viewed in the 
aggregate, leaving home-consumed wheat outside the regulatory scheme would have a 
substantial influence on price and market conditions.”).  Regulation of inactivity is qualitatively-- 
and constitutionally-- different.  
When the Secretary argues incorrectly that in the post-Lochner era only two cases 
support the Commonwealth‟s position, (Doc. 91 at 33) (“Indeed, in the nearly 70 years since the 
Court overruled its Lochner – era understanding of the scope of the commerce power in United 
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the Court has invalidated statutes as beyond the reach of 
that power on only two occasions.”) (citing Lopez and Morrison), she overlooks Alden and New 
York v. United States, while inadvertently emphasizing that no precedent supports her claim of 
congressional power.  To date, the Court has yet to uphold under the Commerce Clause 
regulation of any intrastate activity that is not itself economic in character.  Morrison, 529 U.S. 
at 613 (“thus far in our Nation‟s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of 
intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.”).  Nothing in Raich altered that 
fact.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 18 (“Like the farmer in Wickard, respondents are cultivating, for home 
consumption, a fungible commodity for which there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate 
commerce.”).1  Nor did Raich alter the fact that the Supreme Court “always ha[s] rejected 
                                                 
1
 Although the Secretary cites Justice Scalia‟s concurrence in Raich in support of the proposition 
that non-economic local activity can be regulated (Doc. 91 at 40), Justice Thomas‟ dissent in 
Comstock, which Justice Scalia joined, makes clear his view that true non-economic activity (as 
opposed to commodity production short of selling) can never be regulated under the Commerce 
Clause.  176 L. Ed. 2d at 908 (“Under the Court‟s precedents, Congress may not regulate non-
economic activity (such as sexual violence) based solely on the effect such activities may have, 
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readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that would permit Congress to 
exercise a police power.”  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-19.  
This negative outer limit of the Commerce Clause is why the Secretary‟s claim of power 
must fail.  Her theory that activities substantially affecting interstate commerce include the 
failure to purchase goods or services from another citizen, giving rise to a federal power to 
require such purchases, would create a particularly strong form of federal police power lacking 
principled limits.  Because no limits on the claimed power have been or can be identified, the 
Secretary is not entitled to summary judgment.  
B. Notwithstanding The Secretary’s Argument To The Contrary, 
The Mandate And Penalty Are Not “A Valid Exercise Of 
Congress’s Power Under The Necessary And Proper Clause.”2           
In the first place, the Necessary and Proper Clause “by itself, creates no constitutional 
power.”  Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 247-48 (1960).  In the second place, the affirmative 
outer limit of the Commerce Clause relevant to this case – activities substantially affecting 
interstate commerce – itself depends upon the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1964); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 
119 (1942); United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. 72 (1838).  It would be a mistake to assume that 
that power is part of the Commerce Clause itself that can then be infinitely extended by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  See Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“Congress‟s regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of 
interstate commerce (including activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) 
derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.”).  Taken together, these cases recognize that 
                                                                                                                                                             
in individual cases or in the aggregate, on interstate commerce.”).  Nothing Justice Scalia has 
written suggests that inactivity can be regulated.  
2
 Doc. 91 at 41.  
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Congress can regulate intrastate activity where such regulation is connected and appropriate to 
Congress‟s power to regulate the interstate market.   
 In this way, Congress‟s power remains tethered to the text of the Commerce Clause.  It 
may reach interstate commerce directly.  It may reach economic intrastate activities substantially 
affecting interstate commerce even before they ripen into “commerce” through trade, barter or 
sale, if they affect the common stock of a commodity.  Raich; Wickard.  And Congress may 
regulate both through rules such as the rule against racial discrimination upheld in Heart of 
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).  
 Regulation can reach many things under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  For example, 
“Congress, in order to help ensure the enforcement of federal criminal laws enacted in 
furtherance of its enumerated powers, „can cause a prison to be erected at any place within the 
jurisdiction of the United States, and direct that all persons sentenced to imprisonment under the 
laws of the United States shall be confined there.‟”  Comstock, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 891.  And “the 
power „to establish post offices and post roads‟ . . . is executed by the single act of making the 
establishment . . . . [f]rom this has been inferred the power and duty of carrying the mail along 
the post road, from one post office to another.  And from this implied power, has again been 
inferred the right to punish those who steal letters from the post office, or rob the mail.”  Id. at 
897 (citation omitted).   
However, the mode of regulation must fit the enumerated power by executing it – not by 
altering its character.  “When the inquiry is whether a federal law has sufficient links to an 
enumerated power to be within the scope of federal authority, the analysis depends not on the 
number of links in the congressional-power chain but on the strength of the chain.”  Id. at 900 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  But the question of fit is irrelevant unless the thing being regulated is 
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proper, i.e., the regulation of interstate commerce or of activities substantially affecting interstate 
commerce.  Id. at 889-890 (We have “made clear that, in determining whether the Necessary and 
Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute, we 
look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation 
of a constitutionally enumerated power.”); Id. at 906 (“. . . no matter how „Necessary‟ or 
„Proper‟ an Act of Congress may be to its objective, Congress lacks authority to legislate if the 
objective is anything other than „carrying into Execution‟ one or more of the Federal 
Government‟s enumerated powers.”) (Thomas, J., and Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 In an attempt to escape the negative outer limits of the Commerce Clause, the Secretary 
makes the startling claim that any “provision that is rationally related to the exercise of an 
enumerated power must be sustained [under the Necessary and Proper Clause] unless it violates 
an independent constitutional prohibition.”  (Doc. 91 at 43) (See also Doc. 91 at 41) (Necessary 
and Proper Clause “is an enlargement of, rather than a limitation on, the other powers conferred 
on Congress under Article I”).  This argument stands on its head the notion of a federal 
government of limited, enumerated powers.     
 Of course, it has been known for more than two hundred years that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause neither enlarges any enumerated power nor creates any new power, but merely 
effectuates enumerated powers.  Kinsella, 361 U.S. at 247-48; St. George Tucker, Appendix in 1 
William Blackstone, Commentaries: with Notes of Reference To The Constitution and Laws of 
the Federal Government of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Virginia, 287 (1803) 
(“The plain import of the clause is, that Congress shall have all the incidental or instrumental 
powers, necessary and proper for the carrying into execution all the express powers; . . . It 
neither enlarges any power specifically granted, nor is it a grant of new powers to Congress, but 
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merely a declaration, for the removal of all uncertainty, that the means of carrying into execution 
those otherwise granted, are included in the grant.”).  And if, as seems obvious, the Secretary 
means to exclude the negative outer limits of the Commerce Clause when she speaks of “an 
independent Constitutional prohibition,” her position is easily and decisively refuted.    
 Beginning with the Supreme Court‟s most recent pronouncement on the subject, the 
majority opinion in Comstock recognized that the Morrison negative outer limit denying the 
national government a police power applies to the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Comstock, 176 
L. Ed. 2d at 898 (“Nor need we fear that our holding today confers on Congress a general „police 
power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States.”) (citing 
Morrison).  Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in the judgment in Comstock expressly stated:  
“It is of fundamental importance to consider whether essential attributes of State sovereignty are 
compromised by the assertion of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause; if so, 
that is a factor suggesting that the power is not one properly within the reach of federal power.”  
Id. at 902.  Justice Alito in his concurrence in the judgment said much the same thing:  
The Necessary and Proper Clause does not give Congress carte 
blanche. Although the term “Necessary” does not mean 
“absolutely necessary” or indispensable, the term requires an 
“appropriate” link between a power conferred by the Constitution 
and the law enacted by Congress.  And it is an obligation of this 
Court to enforce compliance with that limitation.  
Id. at 904-05 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland).  Justices Thomas and Scalia in dissent wrote  
Critically, however, McCulloch underscores the linear relationship 
the Clause establishes between the two inquiries:  Unless the end 
itself is „legitimate,‟ the fit between means and end is irrelevant.  
In other words, no matter how “Necessary” or “Proper” an Act of 
Congress may be to its objective, Congress lacks authority to 
legislate if the objective is anything other than “carrying into 
Execution” one or more of the Federal Government‟s enumerated 
powers.  
Id. at 906.   
Case 3:10-cv-00188-HEH   Document 95    Filed 09/23/10   Page 26 of 42
  19 
 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court elsewhere has emphatically held that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause is limited by general principles of federalism independent of any 
direct prohibition.  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. at 732-33 (“When a „Law . . . for carrying into 
Execution‟ the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the 
various constitutional provisions . . . it is not a „Law . . . proper for carrying into Execution the 
Commerce Clause,‟ and is thus, in the words of The Federalist, „merely [an] act of usurpation‟ 
which „deserves to be treated as such.‟”) (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at 923-24).  Not only are there 
clear federalism limits on the Necessary and Proper Clause, but those limits compel the 
conclusion that any attempt to exercise an unenumerated power, such as regulating the status of 
being uninsured, for the purpose of making the regulation of an enumerated power more 
efficient, is improper because the unenumerated power by definition is reserved to the States.  
 Once it is determined that an enactment is improper in this sense, there is nothing further 
to consider under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  That is why the majority opinions in 
Morrison and Lopez find it unnecessary to engage the Clause.  This makes the Secretary‟s 
discussion in her Memorandum of the putative effects of the “conduct” and “decisions” not to 
have insurance constitutionally beside the point.  (Doc. 91 at 44-46).  It simply does not matter 
how necessary the mandate and penalty might be to the congressional scheme.  The end being 
pursued – the exercise of an unenumerated power – is improper under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause and that is the end of it.      
C. The Decision To Forgo Insurance Is Not An Activity 
Substantially Affecting Commerce Within The Meaning Of The 
Necessary And Proper Clause.   
 The claim that “the health care market is unique” (Doc. 91 at 46) is false.  Any market 
can be affected through limiting supply or increasing demand.  Hence the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938 at issue in Wickard could have, in economic theory, just as easily 
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addressed the agricultural crisis by ordering citizens to purchase a certain measure of wheat.  The 
reason Congress could not adopt this approach is that it would not have been supported by an 
enumerated power.  In particular, it would not be a regulation of interstate commerce or of 
economic activities substantially affecting commerce.  Nor is it true that “[h]ealth insurance is 
not an independent consumer product, but a means of managing the risks inherent in a market for 
health care services in which all inevitably participate.”  (Doc. 91 at 46).  As it existed prior to 
PPACA, health insurance (defined as a contract of indemnity against fortuitous risks) when 
voluntarily purchased was a way of managing risks.  And Congress can and has regulated the 
business of insurance under the Commerce Clause.  United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).  It is also true that Congress has directly regulated aspects of the 
health care system, principally by mandating emergency room treatment by hospitals receiving 
federal funds.  Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.  But 
the question in this case is not whether the federal government can regulate the business of 
health insurance or the business of providing health care.  The question is whether it can 
command a citizen to engage in an activity solely for the convenience of the government in 
regulating commerce.  That question must be answered in the negative for at least three reasons.  
 First, the notion that the federal government can issue naked commands that citizens live 
their lives for the convenience of the government is repugnant to historical constitutional 
thinking.  The Constitution was adopted not only for the utilitarian benefits of government, but 
also to “secure the Blessings of Liberty to” the Founders and their “Posterity.”  U.S. Const., 
Preamble.  As Alexander Hamilton told the New York convention, a constitution that “enable[d] 
the Federal Government to penetrate the recesses of domestic life, and control, in all respects, the 
private conduct of individuals” would have been unworthy of ratification.  
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 Second, the claim that citizens can be commanded to purchase goods or services from 
another citizen in order to increase the efficiency of the federal government‟s regulation of 
commercial actors goes beyond the negative outer limits of the Commerce Clause, even as aided 
by the Necessary and Proper Clause, because the claimed power would be unlimited and 
indistinguishable from a national police power.  Lopez; Morrison.  
 Third, the claim that Congress can use unenumerated powers to increase the efficiency of 
its use of an enumerated power is constitutionally incoherent in a government of enumerated 
powers.  By definition, all unenumerated powers “are reserved to the states respectively, or to the 
people.”  U.S. Const. amend. X.    
 Nor is it coherent to assert that “[p]ersons who finance their health care consumption 
without purchasing insurance are engaged in economic activity to an even greater extent than the 
plaintiffs in Raich.”  (Doc. 91 at 48).  Short of adoption of an extreme post-modernist view that 
words are infinitely elastic, it is not true that inaction in the present, with respect to one subject 
matter (insurance), which can lead to undesirable results in the future, is “activity.”  Legislation 
to avert the evil consequences of inaction partake of the police power, as in state child neglect 
cases.  Of course, where someone is already engaged in conduct subject to the Commerce 
Clause, regulation is permissible.  This principle explains why the prohibition of racial 
discrimination in hotels and motels and other public accommodations was proper under the 
Commerce Clause.  (Doc. 91 at 48-49) (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258-59 and 
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969)).  Furthermore, as Daniel expressly notes, 395 U.S. at 303, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has a jurisdictional definition defining its scope in terms of the 
movement of persons and goods in interstate commerce.  
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 The Secretary‟s other supposed examples of Congressional regulation of inaction under 
the Commerce Clause are similarly inapt.  The Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228(a), 
does not create the obligation in question, but enforces it if it involves more than one state, on the 
theory that multi-state child support orders, like multi-state contracts, are things in interstate 
commerce.  See, e.g., United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 480 (4th Cir. 
1997) (“we agree with those circuits which have held that the CSRA properly regulates, as a 
„thing in interstate commerce,‟ the obligation created by state-court child support orders when, as 
the Act requires, and is the situation in this case, the obligated parent and the dependent child 
reside in different states.”) (citing, inter alia Bongiorno and Sage).  See also United States v. 
Kukafka, 478 F.3d 531, 536 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Act includes explicit jurisdictional element that 
limits Act‟s reach to interstate transactions.”). 
 The Secretary also contends that “[c]onduct that substantially affects interstate commerce 
is subject to Congressional regulation, even if it may be characterized as a „failure to act.‟”  
(Doc. 91 at 49) (citing United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir. 2009)).  This 
completely misapprehends Gould.  There, the Fourth Circuit did not uphold the sex offender 
registration requirement under the substantially affects interstate commerce prong of the 
Interstate Commerce Clause at all.  It sustained it under the channels of interstate commerce and 
the persons in interstate commerce prongs.  Gould, 568 F.3d at 471.  Nor did federal jurisdiction 
attach under the act for mere inaction.  “To satisfy the commerce component of § 2250(a), a sex 
offender must have been convicted of a qualifying sex offense, and, after conviction, traveled to 
another state and failed to register or maintain his registration.”  Id. at 471.  This is substantial, 
voluntary activity involving interstate commerce as presently understood.  
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 The Secretary next confuses congressional purpose with congressional power.  It is true 
that Congress requires insurance in a number of enactments.  (Doc. 91 at 49-50, and 50 n.6) 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 4001(c); 42 U.S.C. § 4012a (a), (b), (c), (flood insurance); 49 U.S.C. § 13906 
(interstate motor carriers); 6 U.S.C. § 443(a)(1) (sellers of anti-terrorism technology); 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1441(c )(4) (entities operating in national marine sanctuary); 30 U.S.C. § 1257(f) (surface coal 
mining and reclamation operators); 42 U.S.C. § 2210(a) (Price-Anderson Act) (operators of 
nuclear power plants); 42 U.S.C. § 2243(d)(l) uranium enrichment facility operators); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2458c (b)(2)(A) (aerospace vehicle developers); 45 U.S.C. § 358(a) (railroad unemployment 
insurance).  And it is true that in some or all of these cases Congress‟s purpose is to prevent cost 
shifting in some sense.  However, federal power attaches by virtue of voluntary commercial 
activities subjecting the actors to federal regulation.  This hodgepodge of sadly inapposite 
statutes fails to disguise the fact that the power claimed by the Secretary is radically 
unprecedented.  
 The Secretary‟s discussion of the Super Fund Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seq., confuses the 
substantive, no fault provisions of CERCLA with congressional jurisdiction.  As United States v. 
Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1510-11 (11th Cir. 1997), a case cited by the Secretary (Doc. 91 at 
51), explains, CERCLA lacks either a jurisdictional element or congressional findings with 
respect to Commerce Clause effects.  In that circumstance, courts will conduct a case-by-case 
factual analysis to determine whether an activity otherwise covered by CERCLA substantially 
affects interstate commerce.  In Olin, the voluntary activities of operating a chemical factory 
while storing waste on site were found to substantially affect interstate commerce. 
 The Secretary‟s analysis of eminent domain is highly eccentric.  Eminent domain is not a 
“power to compel a private party to enter into a transaction” (Doc. 91 at 51), it is a taking.  U.S. 
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Const. amend. V.  See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 367, 372-73 (1876) (inferring 
power of eminent domain from limitations of the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Jones, 109 
U.S. 513, 518 (1883) (power inherent).  
D. The Secretary’s Facial Analysis Is Analytically Unsound.   
It is not true that PPACA “reaches individuals who, even on Virginia‟s theory, are market 
participants engaged in economic activity.”  (Doc. 91 at 52).  Even assuming that “[i]ndividuals 
who have, and then drop, health insurance coverage are „active‟” and that “[i]ndividuals who 
receive medical services and render payment (fully or incompletely) are „active,‟” (Doc. 91 at 
52), that is not what Congress chose to regulate.  Instead, Congress is regulating a mere status 
that exists after any decision to drop insurance and prior to any receipt of medical care.  The 
command of the federal government is the unprecedented mandating of a person at rest to enter 
into a commercial relationship with another citizen.  
 As demonstrated supra in Section III (Standard of Review), enumerated power 
challenges are inherently facial only.  It simply does not matter in an enumerated power case 
whether Congress could have regulated a smaller subset of actors had it chosen to do so.  For 
example, in Lopez, Congress could have regulated a subset of gun possession by enacting a 
jurisdictional requirement that the gun have moved in interstate commerce, 514 U.S. at 561-62, 
but chose not to.  The Supreme Court did not parse the law on a facial or as applied basis, but 
instead, struck the enactment on a facial analysis.  The case for a facial invalidation is even 
stronger here where the regulation of inactivity could not be cured by a jurisdictional element.  
The question here is inescapably binary:  which sovereign may regulate the insurance status of 
citizens qua citizen in our system of enumerated federal powers?  
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V. THE MANDATE AND PENALTY CANNOT BE SUSTAINED 
UNDER THE TAXING POWER.  
As this Court observed in its prior opinion, “[c]ontrary to pre-enactment representations 
by the Executive and Legislative branches, the Secretary now argues alternatively that the 
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision is a product of the government‟s power to tax for the 
general welfare.”  (Doc. 84 at 25).  But the Secretary‟s difficulties are in no way reduced or 
avoided by her resort to the taxing power because neither the mandate nor the penalty are taxes.  
By definition, the mandate is not a tax.  It does not seek to raise any revenue, but rather, is a 
command that citizens purchase health insurance.  It is nothing more than an attempt by 
Congress to commandeer citizens into a commercial transaction so that Congress can then 
regulate it and them.  Turning to the penalty, it is not a tax either because calling it a tax is 
contrary to the text of PPACA and to binding Supreme Court precedent. 
The Secretary first argues that the penalty is a tax because “Congress repeatedly treated 
the [penalty] as a tax.” (Doc. 91 at 15).  Contrary to the Secretary‟s assertion, it was Congress 
that called the payment for failure to comply with the mandate a “penalty.”  PPACA § 1501 at § 
5000A(b)(1).  Elsewhere in PPACA, Congress levied taxes, denominated as such, demonstrating 
that it knew how to draw the distinction.  See, e.g., PPACA, §§ 9001, 9004, 9015, 9017, and 
10907.  In the taxing arena, the Supreme Court has refused to permit litigants to denominate as a 
tax that which Congress has denominated an exercise of commerce power.  Bd. of Trs. of the 
Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. at 58 (“But if the Congress may thus exercise the power, 
and asserts, as it has asserted here, that it is exercising it, the judicial department may not attempt 
in its own conception of policy to distribute the duties thus fixed by allocating some of them to 
the exercise of the admitted power to regulate commerce and others to an independent exercise 
of the taxing power.”).   
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The Secretary‟s litigation position – that what Congress labeled a penalty was somehow a 
tax marketed and passed under another name – contradicts the pre-enactment statements of both 
political branches.  Not only should a court not re-label an explicit exercise of commerce clause 
authority a tax, see Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 289 U.S. at 58, it should not even assume that 
the bill would have passed had it enforced the mandate with a tax. Congress was unwilling to pay 
for something approximating universal coverage under its traditional taxing and spending 
powers. Instead, Congress resorted to the naked mandate. 
Ultimately, to prevail on her argument, the Secretary would have to demonstrate that 
there is simply no legal difference between a “penalty” imposed for failure to comply with a 
command of government and a “tax.”  In arguing that there is no distinction between the two, the 
Secretary contends that they are immaterial “statutory label[s].”  (Doc. 91 at 54 n.9).  This 
ignores the fact that under longstanding and binding Supreme Court precedent, the differences 
between a tax and a penalty are justiciable even where Congress calls a penalty a “tax,” which, 
of course, Congress did not do here. 
 For nearly a hundred years, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that “taxes” 
and “penalties” are separate and distinct, stating that “„[a] tax is an enforced contribution to 
provide for the support of government; a penalty, as the word is here used, is an exaction 
imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act.‟”  Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 518 
U.S. at 224 (quoting La Franca, 282 U.S. at 572).  As the La Franca court held, the word “tax” 
and the word “penalty”   
are not interchangeable, one for the other.  No mere exercise of the 
art of lexicography can alter the essential nature of an act or a 
thing; and if an exaction be clearly a penalty it cannot be converted 
into a tax by the simple expedient of calling it such.  That the 
exaction here in question is not a true tax, but a penalty involving 
the idea of punishment for infraction of the law is settled . . . . 
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La Franca, 282 U.S at 572.  To prevail, the Secretary‟s taxing power argument invites this Court 
to first ignore Congress‟s express decision to denominate the penalty a “penalty,” and then to 
“alter the essential nature” of the penalty by ignoring its function so that it can be called a tax.  
Simply put, the taxing power does not and cannot provide the basis for the penalty.  In her 
memorandum, the Secretary ignores the decisions of the Supreme Court that distinguish 
penalties and taxes.  This is especially odd as this Court, in ruling on the Secretary‟s motion to 
dismiss, raised the issue and cited the relevant cases.  (Doc. 84 at 26-27).    
The inescapable conclusion that the penalty is just that, a penalty, is fatal to the 
Secretary‟s tax argument.  As this Court noted in its prior opinion “the power of Congress to 
exact a penalty is more constrained than its taxing authority under the General Welfare Clause – 
it must be in aid of an enumerated power.”  (Doc. 84 at 27) (citing Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. 
v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940); Butler, 297 U.S. 1).  Because the only enumerated power to 
which the Secretary could turn is the Commerce Clause, her tax argument collapses back into her 
Commerce Clause argument.  Because we have already established that the mandate and penalty 
are well outside the outer limits of the Commerce Clause, limits binding on this Court, Rodriguez 
de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477, the Secretary‟s motion for summary judgment is due to be denied.  
The Secretary, of course, continues to argue that the penalty must be a tax because it is 
codified in the tax code and collected by the IRS.   (Doc. 91 at 53-54).  But this argument is 
statutorily barred.  26 U.S.C. § 7806(b) (“No inference, implication, or presumption of 
legislative construction shall be drawn or made by reason of the location or grouping of any 
particular section or provision of this title . . . .”).  See also Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 518 
U.S. at 223 (“No inference of legislative construction should be drawn from the placement of a 
provision in the Internal Revenue Code”).  
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The Secretary also continues to argue that the penalty must be a tax because the Joint 
Committee on Taxation used that term in its post-enactment review of PPACA.  (Doc. 91 at 55).  
Written months after PPACA passed the Senate, the report does not even qualify as “legislative 
history.”  It does not record floor debates and does not detail the contemporaneous thoughts of 
members of Congress as PPACA was passed in the chamber that wrote it.  Because the report 
was produced at a time when PPACA could not be changed in the House of Representatives 
without it being defeated in the Senate, the report cannot be used to influence judicial review 
because that would evade the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I, § 7.  
Finally, it should be noted that the staff of the Joint Committee was not even consistent in its 
terminology.  It call the penalty an “excise tax” in the headings, but labels it a “penalty” in the 
text.  (Doc. 91-1 at 365-368).  
In the end it would not even matter if Congress had called it a tax.  There is recent, 
controlling Supreme Court precedent that demonstrates that the question of whether a provision 
is a penalty or a tax continues to be a question of law for the Court.  In Reorganized CF&I 
Fabricators, 518 U.S. at 224-26, the Supreme Court found a provision to be a penalty even 
though Congress had called it a tax. The Court did so because a “punishment for an unlawful . . . 
omission” is a penalty, not a tax.  Id.  Because the PPACA penalty is an exaction for an omission 
– one that if it operated perfectly would produce no revenue – it is a penalty as a matter of law, 
and the Secretary‟s tax argument fails.  
Because the penalty is not a tax, the Secretary‟s general discourse on the taxing power 
and General Welfare Clause, (Doc. 91 at 52-53), is beside the point.  Furthermore, the cases cited 
establish only the proposition that Congress can tax things that it cannot regulate; a 
noncontroversial proposition.  
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Some of what the Secretary says on the subject of taxation nevertheless warrants 
comment.  Just as she argued in support of her motion to dismiss, the Secretary argues in her 
most recent filing that:  
So long as a statute is “productive of some revenue,” the courts 
will not second-guess Congress‟s exercise of its General Welfare 
Clause powers, and “will not undertake, by collateral inquiry as to 
the measure of the regulatory effect of a tax, to ascribe to Congress 
an attempt, under the guise of taxation, to exercise another power 
denied by the Federal Constitution.”  Sonzinsky v. United States, 
300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937); see also United States v. Jones, 976 
F.2d 176, 183-84 (4th Cir.1992); United States v. Aiken, 974 F.2d 
446, 448-49 (4th Cir. 1992). 
(Doc. 91 at 54-55).  However, as before, important words have been omitted from a composite 
quotation.  The actual quotation is as follows: 
[I]t has long been established that an Act of Congress which on its 
face purports to be an exercise of the taxing power is not any 
the less so because the tax is burdensome or tends to restrict or 
suppress the thing taxed. Inquiry into the hidden motives which 
may move Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred 
upon it is beyond the competency of courts.  They will not 
undertake, by collateral inquiry as to the measure of the regulatory 
effect of a tax, to ascribe to Congress an attempt, under the guise 
of taxation, to exercise another power denied by the Federal 
Constitution.  
Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513-14 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  Given that Congress did not 
pass an act “which on its face purports to be an exercise of the taxing power,” the Secretary is 
actually arguing that Sonzinsky, Jones and Aiken should be read as prohibiting the Court from 
inquiring into the litigation position adopted by the Secretary; one that is contrary to the text of 
PPACA and is “contrary to pre-enactment representations by the Executive and Legislative 
branches . . . .”  (Doc. 84 at 25).  However, by necessary implication, Sonzinsky, Jones, and 
Aiken, stand for the proposition that courts will ordinarily not permit litigants, such as the 
Secretary, to second-guess Congress when, as is the case with the PPACA penalty, it has elected 
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not to invoke its taxing power and has instead chosen to impose a penalty.  This, of course, is not 
to suggest that if Congress had called the “penalty” a “tax” it would magically transform what is 
an unconstitutional penalty into a constitutional exercise of the taxing power. The law is to the 
contrary.  See, e.g., Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 518 U.S. at 224, La Franca, 282 U.S at 572, 
Butler, 297 U.S. at 61, and Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 37.  See also Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. 
at 513 (recognizing and distinguishing Child Labor Tax Case).  
 The Secretary‟s treatment of In re Chateaguay Corp., 53 F.3d 478 (2nd Cir. 1995) (Doc. 
91 at 54), Adventure Res., Inc. v. Holland, 137 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 1998) (Doc. 91 at 56), and In 
re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 1996) (Doc. 91 at 56), cases dealing with 
payments required under the Coal Act, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776, 3036-3056 (1992), 
also invites comment.  While it is true that, in very particular contexts, these cases determined 
that payments under the Coal Act were taxes, a review of the issues raised in them reveals that 
they can be easily distinguished from the instant case and that they provide no support for the 
position of the Secretary. 
 Unlike PPACA, the Coal Act did not impose a “penalty.”  Rather, the  
purpose of the [Coal] Act was to establish a system whereby each current 
and former signatory operator--that is, each operator that “is or was a 
signatory to a coal wage agreement,” as such agreements are defined in 
section 9701(b)(1) of the Act, see § 9701(c)(1)--is required to pay for the 
benefits provided to its own retirees and to share in the cost of providing 
benefits to orphaned retirees. 
  
In re Leckie, 99 F.3d at 576.  Thus, the Coal Act did not impose a “penalty” on coal companies, 
but rather, required them to pay annual benefit premiums consistent with their obligations under 
prior agreements.  Specifically,  
the annual premium for an assigned operator equals the sum of the cost of 
providing health benefits to the company‟s assigned beneficiaries, its pro 
rata share of death benefit coverage, and its pro rata share of the cost of 
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health benefits for “orphaned” beneficiaries. The Coal Act restricts 
liability for medical benefit premiums to companies that (1) signed one or 
more Wage Agreements between 1950 and 1988, (2) continue to 
“conduct[] or derive[] revenue from any business activity, whether or not 
in the coal industry,” and (3) actually employed at least one retiree 
currently receiving benefits.  Id., § 9701(c). 
 
In re Chateaguay Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 486 (1995).  Thus, unlike the penalty in PPACA, Coal Act 
payments were not imposed because of the failure of a party to comply with a government 
command.  This distinction is dispositive, as the United States Supreme Court found in 
Reorganized CF&I Fabricators.   
 The taxing power argument advanced by the Secretary is truly radical.  As she 
summarizes her position, anything that “imposes involuntary pecuniary burdens for a public 
purpose . . . is an exercise of the taxing power. . . ,” and therefore, is constitutional.  (Doc. 91 at 
56).  Not only would adopting this position require this Court to ignore the text of PPACA, the 
justiciable distinctions between taxes and penalties, and binding Supreme Court precedent, 
including Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 37 (regulation by taxation must be supported by 
some enumerated power other than the taxing power), it would also require the Court to find that 
the federal government has always had a national police power through the taxing power.  That 
is so because the Secretary argues that Congress, untethered to any enumerated power other than 
the power to tax, can order any citizen to do anything so long as it also exacts an “involuntary 
pecuniary burden” for non-compliance whose proceeds would go to the Treasury.  This not only 
finds no support in prior decisions of the Supreme Court, it is a proposition that was directly 
rejected in Morrison, which noted that the Court has “always  . . . rejected readings of . . . the 
scope of federal power that would permit Congress to exercise a police power.”  Morrison, 
529 U.S at 618-19 (bolded emphasis added) (internal quotation and citation omitted).  
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Accordingly, under multiple, controlling Supreme Court precedents, the Secretary‟s taxing 
power argument must be rejected.  
CONCLUSION 
 The lack of a limiting principle for the Secretary‟s arguments places the claimed power to 
enact the mandate and penalty well beyond the outer limits of the Constitution.  Instead of 
positing limits, the Secretary‟s argument has grown ever more extreme.  Now she claims that any 
exaction is valid if it “imposes involuntary pecuniary burdens for a public purpose.”  (Doc. 91 at 
56).  
 This places her in a legal predicament because the Secretary ultimately has to win on the 
Commerce Clause, which she cannot do when her position lacks principled limits.  With respect 
to the Commerce Clause and the associated Necessary and Proper Clause, this Court has already 
recognized that the Secretary‟s arguments go beyond the affirmative and negative limits erected 
by the controlling Supreme Court precedents.  With respect to the taxing power argument, the 
rules of decision provided by the Supreme Court render the penalty a penalty and not a tax.  
Because it is a naked penalty, and not a tax, it requires an enumerated power for its support.  In 
this fashion the taxing power argument collapses back into the Commerce Clause argument 
because no other enumerated power could be posited for the support of the penalty.  
 The same legal destination would be reached even if the penalty were to be deemed a tax 
(although there would be additional objections based on a lack of apportionment and non-
uniformity).  As long as it is openly used for regulation, a tax would have to pass muster under 
an enumerated power other than the taxing power.  Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20; Railway 
Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 455 U.S. at 468-69 (alternative power will not be used to support an 
enactment if it evades the limits of another grant).  See also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-19 (the 
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Court has “always . . . rejected readings of . . . the scope of federal power that would permit 
Congress to exercise a police power.”). 
 As the Congressional Research Service warned prior to enactment, the mandate is an 
unprecedented means for implementing PPACA‟s ends with respect to broader coverage.  The 
means chosen by Congress are especially dangerous to those aspects of ordered liberty protected 
by federalism because they represent an unlimited and unbounded power, not just to regulate 
activities, but to directly command the citizen on any subject.  Because the claimed power is 
contrary to all existing Supreme Court authority, the Commonwealth prays this Court to deny the 
Secretary‟s motion.    
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